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BLACKLISTING AS FOREIGN
POLICY: THE POLITICS AND LAW
OF LISTING TERROR STATES
MATTHEW J. PEED
INTRODUCTION
Among the various weapons in America’s antiterrorist arsenal,
one of the most intriguing and enduring is the State Department’s list
of state sponsors of terrorism. Conceived in the heady days of the
1970s,1 the list is a mostly static group of seven countries designated
2
each year by the secretary of state. Although it has remained
3
virtually unchanged from 1993, the list commands more attention
each year.4 A who’s who of rogue states, the release of the list along
with the State Department’s annual terrorism report engenders the
5
ire of the condemned and the relief of the overlooked. Perhaps for its
Copyright © 2005 by Matthew Peed.
1. See infra Part I.A. (describing the origin of the list).
2. Until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the list included Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya,
Syria, Sudan, and Cuba. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003, at 85–92 (2004), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/31944.pdf.
3. Sudan was added to the list in 1993. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1996 (1997),
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/overview.html. The list
remained unchanged until the president removed Iraq from the list following its invasion in
2003. See Presidential Determination No. 2004-52 of September 24, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 58,793
(Sept. 30, 2004) (directing the secretary of state to remove Iraq from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism).
4. An August 28, 2005 Lexis database search for references to the terrorism list in news
articles showed ninety-nine references from 1985 to 1990, 2,228 references for the 1990s, and
7,672 references for 2000 through 2004.
5. For a survey of world reaction to the State Department’s 1999 report, see Fed’n of Am.
Scientists, Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: “Terrorism’s Changing Map,” at http://
www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/05/wwwh0m23.htm (May 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
The survey concludes:
[S]ome found the document “fairly comprehensive” while others disagreed with its
“methodology,” complaining that its conclusions “avoided differentiating between
‘terrorism’ and ‘struggle’” and put “blackmailing terrorist gangs” on equal footing
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promise of clarity and certainty, the list exudes a rhetorical power
6
invoked by groups as diverse as observers of international politics
and producers of popular television shows.7 With this increased
attention have come new questions about the legitimacy of such a
8
blacklist, however, and the designation itself has been called more a
question than an answer.9
Nevertheless, Congress continues to imbue the list with
increasingly substantive legal implications.10 These implications
typically function as automatic triggers, kicking in whenever the
11
secretary of state places a country on the list. Such legal linkages
might be appropriate were the secretary of state free from political
pressures when determining which countries sponsor terror. In fact,
however, the decision to place a country on the list is profoundly
affected by necessary political compromises.12 The proliferation of
automatic consequences that it triggers raises the risk that the list will

with “movements motivated by religious and nationalist incentives” . . . . Detractors
contended that U.S. “strategic interests,” particularly in the building of an oil pipeline
in Central Asia, played a major role in the report’s “categorization” of countries.
Among the more positive assessments was a testimonial from a Lima daily that
reported that Peru is finding ways to combat terrorism thanks to the report, which it
said “is an example of how a well executed domestic policy can generate a positive
foreign reaction.”
Id.
6. E.g., Marilyn Henry, Campaign Under Way to Give Israel Seat on UN Security Council,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at 5. Henry describes an advertisement sponsored by the
American Jewish Committee and published in several international newspapers, which pled,
“Why is it that [these seven nations], all cited by the U.S. State Department as sponsors of
terrorism, are eligible to serve rotating terms on the Security Council, yet Israel, a democratic
nation and member of the UN since 1950, is not?” Id.
7. See, e.g., Press Release, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, NBC
Reiterates, Rationalizes Slander Against Syria (Oct. 20, 1999), at http://www.adc.org/action/
1999/20oct99.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (quoting a letter from Rosalyn Weinman,
Executive Vice-President of Broadcast Standards and Practices at NBC Television, to the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, responding to criticism over the fictional
depiction of Syria as having, without provocation, shot down an unarmed American Air Force
jet by noting that “quality dramas like ‘The West Wing,’ rely on verisimilitude in their
storytelling. And given that Syria is on the official U.S. State Department list of countries that
support terrorism . . . , the reference was fair for the program’s use”).
8. See, e.g., PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 170–71 (2001).
9. See Keith Sealing, “State Sponsors of Terrorism” Is a Question, Not an Answer: The
Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 119, 121 (2003) (analyzing the many questions surrounding the issue of “state
sponsored terrorism”).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part III.
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leave a trail of political consequences in fields of law traditionally
guarded from such considerations.
This has happened in at least one area. In 1996, Congress passed
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
13
(AEDPA). The act abrogated the sovereign immunity of countries
on the terrorism list, and only of countries on the terrorism list, for
14
certain crimes. As a result, several countries have become embroiled
in suits in U.S. courts, while others guilty of similar crimes remain
15
immune. Ironically, the more consequences that flow from inclusion
on the list, the more politically calculating the secretary of state must
be in crafting it. This further undermines the objectivity and
legitimacy of the list. These constraints on the secretary’s discretion
not only lead to inequitable consequences in the courtroom, they
ultimately breed ossification in the list. This threatens its utility and
relevance in the political arena as well.
Reform is overdue. This Note examines the terrorism list in light
of these interrelated problems. Part I explores the background and
birth of the terrorism list as an extension of wartime economic
sanctions policy and reviews Congress’s significant enhancements of
the list’s consequences beyond the economic and diplomatic realm,
principally through the AEDPA and post-9/11 legislation. Part II
examines the fallout for the rule of law that results from the linking of
an executive-determined and often politicized blacklist with the legal
doctrine of sovereign immunity through the AEDPA. Finally, Part III
proposes measures that could lessen the temptation to list states for
political reasons, diffusing some of the list’s externalities. By creating
a more transparent, objective, and accurate list of countries
sponsoring terrorism, the judicial inequities of the AEDPA and
subsequent statutes can be mitigated. Moreover, a more accurate list
will abate international cynicism over the list’s political motives,
ultimately strengthening the list as the legal and diplomatic tool it was
designed to be.

13. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000).
15. Compare Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993) (finding that Saudi Arabia is
immune from suits alleging torture), with Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
180 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding that Libya is not immune from a suit alleging
false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress), and Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 25 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that Iran is not immune from
punitive damages for acts of terrorism).
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I. BIRTH AND EXPANSION OF THE TERRORISM LIST
A. Economic Sanctions and the Origin of the Terrorism List
The list of state sponsors of terrorism is primarily a product of
the law of economic sanctions. During World War I, the U.S. first
began to use economics sanctions systematically as a tool of foreign
policy through the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TEA).16 The
Act allowed the president to declare a national emergency with
respect to a country and comprehensively regulate financial
transactions with that country. Eventually these powers were
extended through the International Emergency Economic Powers
17
Act of 1977 (IEEPA), which allows the president to promulgate
sanctions toward individual countries after first declaring a state of
national emergency with respect to that country.18 In addition to this
“emergency” power, Congress also delegated to the president the
power to regulate all foreign commerce as a tool of foreign policy
through the Export Control Act of 1949 (ECA).19 This act was
intended as a temporary measure that would give the president
substantial powers to deal with the post–World War II security
threat.20 The periodic renewals of the Act, beginning with the Export
21
Administration Act (EAA) of 1969, constitute the statutory basis of
22
most economic sanctions. During each lapse between renewals, the
president has continued sanctions by declaring national emergencies
23
under the IEEPA.

16. Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (2000)).
17. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1628 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2000)).
18. Petra Minnerop, Legal Status of State Sponsors of Terrorism in US Law, in TERRORISM
AS A CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY?
733, 758 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2004).
19. Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7, 8–9 (1949).
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841, 845 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (2000)).
22. ROBERT D. SHUEY ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., NO. RL30169, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS: EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979 REAUTHORIZATION,
Summary (last updated Jan. 2, 2003) (available at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/
rl30169.pdf).
23. Id. at 3–4. For examples of such renewals, see Exec. Order No. 13,222, 3 C.F.R. 783
(2002); Exec. Order No. 12,867, 3 C.F.R. 649 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,730, 3 C.F.R. 305
(1991); Exec. Order No. 12,470, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,444, 3 C.F.R. 214
(1984); Exec. Order No. 11,940, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1977).
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When the EAA came up for renewal after the terrorist atrocities
of the 1970s, an amendment was added that would become the main
24
statutory authority for the list of state sponsors. Section 6(j) of the
act requires a license for the export of militarily relevant goods or
technology to any country that the secretary of state determines has
“repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”25
The section also requires the secretary to list the designated countries
26
in the Federal Register and submit a report to Congress before the
designation is rescinded.27 For a country to be removed, the secretary
must certify that there has been a “fundamental change in the
leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned,”
i.e., that a coup had occurred, or that the government has not
28
provided any support for terrorism “in the preceding six months.”
Although the statutory basis of the terrorism list is not limited to
Section 6(j), most of the economic consequences of being included on
the list relate to a fabric of export restrictions that reference Section
29
For example, under the International Security and
6(j).
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, the president has almost
unlimited discretion to restrict or ban imports from countries on the
Section 6(j) list.30 Similarly, specific statutes have been enacted
against certain countries on the list, creating presidential authority for
31
severe sanctions. Though these statutes do not depend upon the

24. See 50 U.S.C. § 2405(j) (2000).
25. Id. § 2405(j)(1)(A).
26. Id. § 2405(j)(3).
27. Id. § 2405(j)(4).
28. Id. This requirement seems almost comical today in light of the inability of many
countries to extricate themselves from the list despite their repudiation of terrorism for many
years. See infra Part III.A.
29. Minnerop, supra note 18, at 743.
30. 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9 (2000) (“The President may ban the importation into the
United States of any good or service from any country which supports terrorism or terrorist
organizations or harbors terrorists or terrorist organizations.”) The president has invoked
this authority to enact restrictions against Iran and Libya. See Exec. Order No. 12,613,
31 C.F.R. § 560.201, 52 Fed. Reg. 41940 (1987) (Iran); Exec. Order No. 12,538, 3 C.F.R. 395,
50 Fed. Reg. 47527 (1985) (Libya).
31. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785, 815 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021(2000)) (enacted to garner support for the transition
to democratic government in Cuba); Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat.
1541 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)) (enacted to discourage contributions to Libya and
Iran’s military efforts); Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 108-175, 117 Stat. 2482 (2003) (codified at 22 U.S.C.S. § 2151 (West Supp. 2004)) (enacted
to stop Syrian support for terrorism).
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Section 6(j) list for their authority, they typically do not expire until
32
the country is removed from that list.
In addition to the trade restrictions applied by the 1979
amendments to the EAA, two other acts require the State
Department to identify terrorist states as means of applying economic
pressure to countries based on their support for terrorism. First, the
33
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) prohibits U.S. agricultural aid, Peace
Corps involvement, and Export-Import Bank assistance to countries
34
identified by the secretary of state as state sponsors of terrorism.
These provisions were enacted in 1976 when human rights became
more of a policy focus in U.S. foreign aid programs.35 Second, the
Arms Export Control Act restricts the sale of munitions to countries
36
identified as supporting terrorism. This act plays prominently in the
multifarious sanctions concerning nuclear nonproliferation and state
37
sponsors of terrorism.
Although all three of these statutes presuppose a terrorsponsoring designation process and require that those designations be
published in the Federal Register, none require the creation of an
official list of state sponsors of terrorism, nor do they define either
38
sponsorship or terrorism. Rather, these provisions were added in a
1987 statute requiring the secretary of state to provide Congress with
an annual report on worldwide terrorism that includes the list of
states designated as state sponsors.39 The statute provides a definition
of terrorism to guide the report: “premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents.”40 In the report, Patterns of Global
Terrorism, the secretary of state must identify those countries which
will be subject to the Section 6(j) and other sanctions, and thus
compose the official terrorism list. Unfailingly, the annual release of

32. Minnerop, supra note 18, at 758.
33. 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (2004).
34. Minnerop, supra note 18, at 759–60.
35. See International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151–2796 (2000)) (adding the terrorism
provision and detailing Congress’s findings and preferences concerning human rights and
terrorism).
36. 22 U.S.C. § 2780.
37. See id. (delineating prohibited transactions with countries on the terrorism list).
38. Minnerop, supra note 18, at 743.
39. 22 U.S.C. § 2656(f) (2000).
40. Id.
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this report creates a regular media splash despite the unchanging
41
nature of the list itself.
B. The AEDPA and the Expansion of the Terrorism List’s Legal
Consequences
For most of its tenure, the terrorism list was limited in its effects
to the core diplomatic areas of trade sanctions and aid restrictions.
More recently, however, Congress has begun to link the terrorism list
to more substantive legal classifications significantly removed from
the diplomatic realm. The most significant enhancement of the list’s
consequences occurred with the passage of the AEDPA. The
AEDPA references the terrorism list in several ways. First, the act
makes it a crime for individuals to engage in financial transactions
with countries on the list.42 Second, it requires the U.S. to withhold
FAA assistance even from countries that give foreign aid, loans, or
43
subsidies to countries on the list. Third, the act orders the U.S.
missions to several international financial institutions to use the
“voice and vote” of the U.S. to oppose any loan to terrorist-list
countries.44 This provision applies to U.S. representatives at the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank), the International Development Association, the International
Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and any
fund created after the statute’s enactment.45
Although these provisions significantly increased the list’s
penalties, each follows the general principle of the terrorism list—no
aid or trade for terrorism-list countries. The AEDPA went further,
however, enhancing the terrorism list’s import beyond these
economic pressures. It did so by amending the Foreign Sovereign

41. See Fed’n of Am. Scientists, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing the “wide-ranging discussion”
that the release of the 1999 report generated in Europe, Asia, and Latin America).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2332d (2000).
43. 22 U.S.C. § 2377. For good reason, the president was given a waiver over this heavyhanded provision. Failing to include such a waiver would have created considerable diplomatic
embarrassment, as even staunch allies may fail to see eye-to-eye on the terrorism list. See, e.g.,
Sam Kiley, France Training Sudan Intelligence Service, TIMES (London) Sept. 13, 1994, at 1
(describing French military assistance to Sudan, a nation on the terrorist list).
44. 22 U.S.C. § 262p-4q (2000).
45. Id.
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46
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) to allow U.S. citizens to sue
countries on the list for acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, and
terrorism.47 Previously, the FSIA shielded even terrorist-list countries
from suit for any action other than those falling into a narrow
48
exception for commercial activity. After the amendment, however,
countries on the terrorism list could be sued for certain specified acts
committed while the country was on the list, while nonblacklisted
countries retained their sovereign immunity from litigation for the
same acts.49
th
C. Post-September 11 Legislation

The legislative response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks has further
added to the terrorism list’s legal implications. For example, a
provision of the USA PATRIOT Act50 effectively equates nationals
51
of terror-list countries with criminals. The statute makes it a crime
for any “restricted person” to transport or receive any biological
toxin.52 The statutory definition of “restricted persons” includes only
persons convicted for serious crimes, fugitives of justice, drug users,
53
the mentally ill, and aliens from countries on the terrorism list.
These aliens are also singled out for more special attention in the
54
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Act of 2002. The Act
prohibits aliens from states on the terrorism list from receiving
immigrant visas unless the secretary of state, in consultation with the
Attorney General, makes a specific finding that the alien does not
pose a threat to national security.55
A survey of pending legislation indicates that the list continues to
be a focus of congressional attention. Apparently unsatisfied with the
Enhanced Border Security legislation passed in 2002, Representative

46. Id. § 1605.
47. Id. § 1605(a)(7)(A).
48. Id. § 1605; see also Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(describing the history of the FSIA).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2000).
50. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 412, 201–25, 115 Stat. 272,
350–52, 278–96 (codified in scattered Titles of U.S.C.).
51. Minnerop, supra note 18, at 758.
52. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175(b)(2) (2000)).
53. Minnerop, supra note 18, at 767.
54. Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1735 (2000).
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Barrett has proposed barring the admission of aliens from terrorist56
list countries altogether. After the uproar over Libya’s chairing of
the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Representative Fossella
proposed a bill requiring the U.S. to withhold “contributions to any
United Nations commission, organization, or [] agency that is
chaired” by a terror-list country.57 A similar sentiment is evident in a
resolution put forth by Representative Crowley, calling for the U.N.
58
to suspend the membership of any state on the terrorism list.
Although these pending bills may never be enacted, they do indicate
the attractiveness of the list for congressional sloganeering and
problem solving.59
II. PROBLEMS WITH GIVING THE
TERRORISM LIST JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES
Political jockeying has plagued the terrorism list; its history is
replete with moves of questionable sincerity, creating classifications
that are out of step with countries’ practices.60 Nevertheless, as Part I
indicates, the consequences of the terrorism list continue to expand as
Congress employs the list as a ready-made vehicle for counterterrorist
initiatives. This creates its own problems in the political sphere, but it
is especially incongruous with judicial principles such as consistency,
61
transparency, and equality. Given the tremendous political and
diplomatic pressures surrounding the designation of a state as a
sponsor of terrorism, the trend toward increasing the legal and
judicial effects of the designation beyond the realm of foreign policy
is therefore increasingly problematic.
In particular, Congress’s decision to amend the FSIA to allow
suits against state sponsors of terrorism has received heavy criticism.
Although the aims of the AEDPA’s amendment of the FSIA were to

56. Stop Terrorist Entry Program Act of 2003, H.R. 3075, 108th Cong. (2003).
57. H.R. 800, 108th Cong. (2003).
58. H.R. Con. Res. 293, 107th Cong. (2001).
59. See Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 217, 269–71 (1999) (describing the congressional evasion of
responsibility that makes certification requirements attractive).
60. See infra Part III (discussing the politically motivated delisting of Iraq, continued listing
of North Korea and Cuba, and omission of Pakistan and Greece from the list).
61. See, e.g., Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision 56–83 (1961) (identifying
certainty, consistency, fairness, and equality as justifications for adherence to precedent).
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62
many
compensate victims and deter terrorism countries,
63
commentators have argued that it has done neither. Others have
noted that foreign-policy-by-litigation illegitimately grants judges and
plaintiffs’ attorneys a power that should reside in the political
branches.64 For example, by awarding damages out of the frozen
assets of terrorist-list countries, judges limit the president’s ability to
65
use those assets to diplomatic ends. There is also the potential for
political friction caused by the pronouncement of judgments on
foreign states, and political embarrassment when those states retaliate
66
with similar trials arising from American actions.

62. Allison Taylor, Note, Another Front in the War on Terrorism? Problems with Recent
Changes to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 552 (2003); see also
Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2000) (describing Congress’s
purposes in enacting the AEDPA); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 34
(D.D.C. 1998) (indicating that the purpose of the AEDPA is to deter acts of terrorism and to
provide for punitive damages).
63. See, e.g., Sean K. Mangan, Note, Compensation for “Certain” Victims of Terrorism
Under Section 2000 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Individual
Payment at Institutional Cost, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1037, 1067–68 (2002) (highlighting the failure of
the AEDPA to achieve victim compensation); Taylor, supra note 62, at 534 (“In the years since
the terrorism exception was added to the FSIA, it has accomplished neither compensation nor
deterrence.”).
64. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 457, 460 (2001) (“The most significant cost of international human rights litigation is
that it shifts responsibility for official condemnation and sanction of foreign governments away
from elected political officials to private plaintiffs . . . . These actors, however, have neither the
expertise nor the constitutional authority to determine US foreign policy.”); Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross, Note, A Critique of the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 887 (2002) (“Because terrorism is a foreign policy
problem, it is best dealt with by the political branches of government rather than by a wide array
of courts and judges engaging in their own foreign policy experiments.”).
65. The Clinton administration vigorously resisted congressional efforts to use Iran’s $251.9
million in frozen assets to satisfy terror judgments. Taylor, supra note 62, at 546. These assets,
the administration argued, are important diplomatic bargaining chips and necessary components
of a flexible foreign policy. Id. Indeed, the release of frozen assets was critical in securing the
release of U.S. hostages from Iran in 1981. Id.
66. See, e.g., Sealing, supra note 9, at 121 (“Since there are many states that would consider
the United States a state sponsor of terrorism, the United States should expect to be haled into
diverse foreign domestic courts by victims of ‘terrorists’ funded and supplied by the United
States.”); Sean P. Vitrano, Comment, Hell-Bent on Awarding Recovery to Terrorism Victims:
The Evolution and Application of the Antiterrorism Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 213 (2000) (describing the AEDPA as opening a
“Pandora’s box”); Roger Parloff, Sue Afghanistan!, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Dec. 23, 2001, at 9
(“Do we really want Chinese courts deciding whether the United States’ unintended bombing of
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 was a violation of international law? Do we want
Saudi courts opining on whether Israel engages in state-sponsored racism and terrorism?”).
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Although many of these criticisms apply generally to suits against
foreign nations, the AEDPA presents several problems related solely
to the use of the terrorism list in a judicial context, where principles of
67
equality and uniformity should prevail. First, by tying the subject
matter jurisdiction of federal courts to the decision of the secretary of
state, the statute invites foreign policy entanglement in the judicial
process. Second, by using political criteria to determine which nations
may be sued, the AEDPA fosters inconsistent treatment of similarly
situated plaintiffs and defendants.68 Third, by only allowing suits
against specific countries, the statute encourages plaintiffs to stretch
the bounds of plausibility in their pleadings to catch a state-sponsor of
terrorism, warping the judicial process.69
A. Inconsistent Treatment of Defendants
Historically, sovereign nations were considered immune from the
jurisdiction of the domestic courts of other sovereign nations.
Whether expressed as a principle of right under international law,70 or
71
as merely a national exercise of comity and reciprocity, the effect
was to shield foreign nations from the ignominy of being haled into
court before their equals. This long-standing custom came under
pressure in the twentieth century, however, as contacts between
nations increased exponentially and state-controlled industries greatly
expanded into the commercial sphere.72 This created a competitive
disadvantage and the potential for injustice for private parties,
because nationalized enterprises could hide behind the sovereign
immunity defense in commercial or contractual disputes.73 As a result,
74
a new “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity emerged and had a

67. Wasserstrom, supra note 61, at 56–83.
68. Taylor, supra note 62, at 550.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that Germany, as a sovereign nation, could not be sued by plaintiff, a Holocaust
survivor, in United States courts due to lack of jurisdiction).
71. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812)
(holding that an American vessel seized under a decree of Napoleon could not be reclaimed
when it entered American territory because the schooner, while in U.S. territory, entered
“under an implied promise, that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly
manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country”).
72. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
73. Id. at 271.
74. Id.
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75
degree of success in the courts. This theory considered nations to be
immune from suits arising from public acts (jure imperii), but not
those arising from private or commercial acts (jure gestionis).76 The
State Department, in a legal opinion that would come to be known as
77
the “Tate Letter,” adopted the restrictive theory in 1952.
Although the Tate Letter acknowledged that such a shift in
78
executive policy “cannot control the courts,” the difficulty of
navigating this public/private distinction eventually led courts to
request “suggestions of immunity” from the secretary of state on a
case-by-case basis.79 These suggestions, filed with courts by the
secretary of state, were almost universally followed by courts in their
80
immunity rulings. Because of political pressures facing the State
Department, these suggestions sometimes produced embarrassing
immunity determinations that sacrificed commercial interests to
diplomatic goodwill and left courts without objective rules of law for
determining immunity.81 This inconsistency greatly frustrated jurists,
sometimes prompting scathing opinions.82
In response to these developments, Congress passed FSIA,
codifying the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity expressed in
the Tate Letter.83 FSIA’s express purpose was to replace the

75. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945) (denying immunity to a
Mexican state-owned vessel under the control of a private party under contract with the
government).
76. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (discussing the absence of precedent in customary
international law for granting immunity for a foreign sovereign’s commercial acts).
77. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the United States Department of
State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General of the United States (May 19, 1952),
reprinted in 26 Dep’t State Bull. No. 678 at 984 (June 27, 1952).
78. Id. at 985.
79. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
80. Id.
81. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 271–72.
82. Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court summed up the feeling of many
jurists with his dissent in Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864, 893,
(1966):
The sovereign immunity doctrine . . . is no longer a healthy manifestation of society.
It is, in fact, an excrescence on the body of the law, it encourages irresponsibility to
world order, it generates resentments and reprisals. Sovereign immunity is a
stumbling block in the path of good neighborly relations between nations, it is a sour
note in the symphony of international concord, it is a skeleton in the parliament of
progress, it encourages government toward chicanery, deception and dishonesty.
Sovereign immunity is a colossal effrontery, a brazen repudiation of international
moral principles, it is a shameless fraud.
83.

Letter from Jack B. Tate, supra note 77.
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84
“considerable uncertainty” of immunity decisions with “uniformity”
by shifting responsibility for them from the foreign policy apparatus
of the State Department to the judiciary.85 Doing so, Congress felt,
would “assure litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on
86
purely legal grounds.”
In light of this purpose, the AEDPA’s incorporation of the state
sponsors of terrorism list into the FSIA is a significant departure from
the purpose of the Act. It resurrects the State Department’s ability to
introduce highly political considerations into determinations of
sovereign immunity, raising the very concerns Congress sought to
87
avoid. Although the provision ostensibly focuses on the most
abhorrent crimes of the most stigmatized regimes, producing less
embarrassing results than the case-by-case executive determinations
of old, its tendency to undermine judicially appropriate principles
such as objectivity and uniformity is no less real. As the heart of the
U.S. foreign policy apparatus, the State Department must balance
competing and often contradictory policy goals. Decisions over which
countries to put on the list, no less than decisions to file “suggestions
of immunity,” are fraught with political considerations.88 As a result,
major allies are often spared inclusion despite their ties to terrorists,89
while longtime enemies remain on the list despite scant evidence of
90
state support of terrorism.

B. Inconsistent Treatment of Victims
While disparate treatment of equally abhorrent regimes might
not garner much sympathy, there is another problem with using the

84. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 9 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
85. Id. at 13.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. For example, North Korea remains on the list largely as a bargaining chip for nuclear
negotiations, while Cuba’s presence on the list owes more to internal U.S. politics and the
pariah status of Fidel Castro. PILLAR, supra note 8, at 161. Similarly, Pakistan, a U.S. ally, and
Greece, a NATO member, have remained off the list despite their reported ties to terrorist
groups. Id. at 179–84. Another political episode in the list’s history is the removal of Iraq by the
Reagan administration, discussed infra notes 222–30 and accompanying text.
89. See Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International
Terrorism 25 (2000), available at http://www.gpo.gov/nct/nct9.pdf (urging the State Department
to confront the failure of longtime allies Pakistan and Greece to combat terrorism).
90. See Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Cuba, at
http://www.terrorismanswers.com/sponsors/cuba.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (describing the paucity of evidence of Cuban ties to terrorism).
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list of state sponsors of terrorism as part of a legal regime: the
potential for creating unprincipled distinctions between similarly
91
situated plaintiff-victims. Because the terrorism list is both over- and
underinclusive—that is, it retains unfriendly states no longer engaged
in terrorism while omitting allies that are—victims of state violence
have unequal access to courts of justice. Ironically, a defendant,
Libya, was the first to raise this argument as an equal protection
challenge to the state-sponsored terrorism classification.92 “[F]rom the
plaintiff’s point of view,” Libya argued, “it is of no moment that the
alleged torturer was a Saudi Arabian jail guard . . . or a Libyan jail
guard.”93 As a constitutional argument, this challenge went nowhere.
Because no fundamental right or suspect classification was
implicated, the court dismissed the argument after applying rational
basis review to the terror-list classification and finding that the list
rationally related to the goal of preventing terrorism.94 This
conclusion is undoubtedly correct as a matter of constitutional
doctrine. As a broader critique of the state sponsors of terrorism
exception to the FSIA, however, Libya’s rather self-serving argument
merits attention.
Because the state sponsors of terrorism list is the only window
for judicial scrutiny of the noncommercial, extraterritorial acts of
95
states, victims of nonlist states remain without a remedy under U.S.
law, no matter how egregious the states’ crimes may be.96 This
discrepancy leads to disparities between victims that are difficult to

91. Taylor, supra note 62, at 550.
92. Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 180 F. Supp. 2d 78, 86 (D.D.C.
2001) (citing Def. Mot. to Dismiss). Libya had tried a similar equal protection argument in
Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), but
apparently misconceived the role of the terrorism classification as simply a jurisdictional
predicate, urging strict scrutiny for the interference with its right to a fair trial. Iraq echoed the
equal protection argument in Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 52 (D.D.C. 2000),
but requested only rational basis review. In neither case does this particular attack on the
classification make its way into the court’s analysis, as it did in Simpson.
93. Simpson, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 86. This argument is more than mere rhetoric. In Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), the plaintiff was indeed the victim of torture at the hands
of Saudi Arabian jail guards. Unlike the victim in Simpson, however, Nelson was unable to
recover because the actions giving rise to the suit did not fit the FSIA’s narrow commercial
exception. Id. at 363.
94. Simpson, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), (e), (f) (2000).
96. See Jennifer A. Gergen, Note, Human Rights and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 765, 770–71 (1996) (noting that FSIA offers the only exceptions to states’
sovereign immunity).
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justify. For example, while victims of slave labor camps in Nazi
97
Germany cannot recover damages under the FSIA, a plaintiff was
able to receive a $7 million judgment against Cuba for the emotional
98
trauma of being tricked into marrying a spy. This disparity is
particularly poignant given the paucity of evidence that Cuba still
engages in state-sponsored terrorism.99 It also highlights one of the
strongest arguments against restricting the FSIA’s exceptions to those
states on the list: if the point of the list is to deter state acts of
terrorism, why not allow recovery against all nations for terrorist
acts? There seems to be no good reason to provide a cause of action
for nonterrorism-related acts against terror-list countries, particularly
ones that may have shed their terrorist ways, while preserving the
immunity of nonlisted countries, even for acts of torture or
terrorism.100
Interestingly, the FSIA exception can also discriminate among
victims of the same terrorist state, depending on when the violation
101
occurred. The statute permits a cause of action only if the foreign
state was designated a state sponsor of terrorism either at the time of
the event that gives rise to the suit or directly as a result of that
event.102 Several of the original hostages held in Iran from 1979 to
1981 bumped up against this provision when they recently tried to
103
recover under the AEDPA amendments. Because Iran was not
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism until 1984, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case

97. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
98. US Court Exposes Cuban “Honey Trap,” BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1212575.stm (reporting that a U.S. court awarded Ana
Margarita Martinez $7 million in damages for being “raped” by her nominal husband, an
alleged Cuban spy, every time they had intercourse).
99. See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 90 (indicating that experts doubt that
Cuba supports terrorism despite the U.S. government’s belief that it does).
100. The plight of Scott Nelson in Saudi Arabia further underscores this inequity. After
being arrested without charge, brutally beaten, kept hungry in a rat-infested jail, and forced to
sign Arabic confession documents, Nelson was left without recovery of damages due to Saudi
Arabia’s immunity under FSIA. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993)
(dismissing claims due to lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA because the alleged acts were not
based on a commercial activity as required under the statute). It is difficult to see how barring
such a suit, while allowing suits against countries like Cuba, promotes counterterrorism policy.
101. Taylor, supra note 62, at 550.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(7)(A) (2000).
103. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 159–60 (D.D.C. 2002).
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for lack of jurisdiction, finding the cause of Iran’s listing too remote
104
from the suffering of the hostages to qualify under the statute.
C. Confusing Default Judgments and Warping of the Pleadings
Process
Because only seven countries can currently be sued under the
terrorism exception, a tremendous temptation exists for victims of
terrorist attacks and their lawyers to search for any conceivable
105
connection to one of the designated states. This temptation is
strengthened by the possibility of multimillion-dollar default
judgments106 and the sense of vindication that comes from holding
someone accountable for unspeakable horrors inflicted against one’s
107
loved ones. While state sponsors of terrorism should certainly be
held accountable, the fact that virtually all of these states fail to offer
108
defenses greatly increases the incentive for questionable claims.
This incentive can result in claims that truly stretch the bounds of
plausibility.109
Because many foreign states do not defend these suits, there is
no adversarial testing of evidence, and the plaintiffs need only
convince a judge that the evidence is “satisfactory” to obtain a default
judgment.110 This raises the potential for erroneous rulings that distort

104. Id. at 161.
105. For example, several 9/11 victims have sued Iraq for the attacks, despite the lack of
evidence of its involvement. See Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). Afghanistan, a more natural target, is immune under FSIA because it is not on the terror
list.
106. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 64, at 505–06 (2002) (recounting that courts have
entered “massive default judgments based solely on allegations” made against Iran in eight suits
and citing relevant cases).
107. See Donna M. Balducci, Note, American Taxpayers Bear the Burden of Beating Iraq in
the Courtroom, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 819, 842 (2003) (“The main objective of naming Iraq as a
defendant is to make the country pay. Pay morally. Pay financially. Morally, in the eyes of the
victims, Iraq will pay by being held accountable in an official setting . . . .”).
108. See id. at 827 (recounting that Iran failed to appear in court in each of sixteen cases in
which multimillion-dollar judgments were entered against it).
109. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 62, at 551–52 (describing a lawsuit filed by Judicial Watch
against Iraq for the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City). The complaint,
which alleges a conspiracy between Terry Nichols, Ramzi Yousef, and Iraqi agents, is available
at http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/86/complaint.html.
110. See 28 U.S.C. §1608(e) (2000) (“No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of
the United States or of a State against a foreign state . . . unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.”); see also Editorial, Foreign Policy
by Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2002, at A22 (noting that plaintiffs “need only convince a
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the public’s perception of events and create legal and diplomatic
hurdles should U.S. policy toward the country shift. In one case, for
example, the plaintiffs managed to “prove,” in just two days of
uncontested testimony, what the Bush administration still has not
been able to demonstrate: a conclusive link between Iraq and the
events of September 11, 2001.111 The timing of the ruling, during a
period of intense public debate over a recently launched war, was
especially troublesome. Anyone unfamiliar with the nature of default
judgments, or who simply read a headline reporting the outcome of
the case, could easily misinterpret the ruling as a judicial endorsement
of Iraq’s complicity in the 2001 terrorist attacks.112 Such
misperceptions risk allowing the executive to cloak its policy
113
arguments in the “neutral colors of judicial action.”
D. Separation of Powers Concerns
In theory, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from
delegating excessive legislative authority to coordinate branches.114 In
practice, however, no congressional delegation of power has been
115
struck down by the Supreme Court since the New Deal. So long as
the executive’s discretion is constrained by an “intelligible principle,”
116
the Court will not overturn the delegation. The laxity of this
requirement is nearly impossible to overstate: the constraining
principle can be something as malleable as “the public interest”117 or a

judge that the evidence is ‘satisfactory’” to secure a “windfall” when defendant states fail to
appear).
111. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(finding “satisfactory” evidence that Iraq materially supported Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda
in their attacks on the United States).
112. Like a child’s game of telephone, subsequent reporting can, in turn, increase the risk of
misperception. See, e.g., Patricia Hurtado, Baghdad Liable for September 11: Judge, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, May 9, 2003, available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/08/
1052280380297.html (reporting the court’s “finding” that Iraq was complicit without explaining
the nature of the default judgment proceeding or the minimal evidentiary threshold it requires).
113. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989).
114. For a general explanation of the doctrine, including its possible renaissance, see
generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1721 (2002).
115. Id. at 1723.
116. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
117. See N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24–25 (1932) (noting that the
public interest is a legitimate criterion by which to evaluate delegation questions).
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118
standard as subjective as “generally fair and equitable.” Thus, as a
constitutional matter, the definition of terrorism provided by the list’s
reporting requirements119 falls well within the scope of intelligible
principles previously sanctioned by the Court, even if the list’s
120
members do not accurately reflect that definition.
Does this end the inquiry? Regardless of the specificity of the
guidance given the executive by a congressional delegation of
authority, one might wonder whether all congressional powers could
be so delegated. If there is a hierarchy of values, certainly the
legislative power to define the scope of federal jurisdiction exists near
the top. The Seventh Circuit expressed this view in construing a
statute narrowly to avoid a constitutional problem: “[O]ne can readily
distinguish between Congress’ ability to delegate its commerce power
over price controls during wartime and its ability to delegate a power
as sensitive and central to our Anglo-American legal tradition as
121
shaping a federal court’s jurisdiction.” A similar position was
expressed by the Eleventh Circuit, which took it as “axiomatic” that
Congress could not delegate the power to any agency to strip federal
courts of subject matter jurisdiction.122
This view of Congress’s power to delegate has featured
prominently in arguments by Libya and Iraq that the AEDPA’s
123
amendment of the FSIA is unconstitutional. All four courts to hear
124
the issue saw no need to reach its merits, however. Because both
Libya and Iraq were on the terrorism list when Congress passed the

118. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 426 (1944) (approving as “sufficiently
definite and precise” the “generally fair and equitable” standard articulated by Congress for
courts to use in adjudicating price control disputes under the Emergency Price Control Act).
119. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., supra note 88 (comparing reasons for including both North Korean and Cuba
on the list).
121. U.S. v. Mitchell, 18 F.3d 1355, 1360 n.7 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).
122. Miller v. FCC, 66 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 1995).
123. See Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 755, 762–63 (2d
Cir. 1998) (stating Libya’s argument that the AEDPA is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power); see also Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 49 (D.D.C. 2000)
(advancing the same argument).
124. See Rein, 162 F.3d at 764 (failing to find any delegation of power by Congress via the
AEDPA); Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 180 F. Supp. 2d 78, 86
(D.D.C. 2001) (finding no delegation by Congress as to whether the FSIA applied to Libya
following the 1996 amendments); Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (finding no delegation of power
with regard to Iraq’s inclusion under the AEDPA); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d 10, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding no delegation by Congress as to
whether the FSIA applied to Libya following the 1996 amendments).
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AEDPA in 1996, these courts presumed that Congress specifically
125
intended to strip these countries of their immunity. As the Rein
court explained, “No decision whatsoever of the Secretary of State
was needed to create jurisdiction over Libya. . . . That jurisdiction
existed the moment that the AEDPA amendment became law.”126
Without deciding the issue, the Rein court nevertheless laid out a
127
strong argument for the constitutionality of the provision. It based
its reasoning on two cases in which a factual determination by the
128
executive controlled the court’s jurisdiction: Jones v. United States
and Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily.129 In Jones, the court’s
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant turned on whether the island of
130
Navassa was within U.S. territory. Congress had delegated this
determination to the secretary of state in the Guano Island Act of
1856.131 In deciding whether it had subject matter jurisdiction, the
court ruled that the secretary’s determination of territorial
132
jurisdiction settled the matter. In Matimak, the court’s diversity
jurisdiction depended on whether the United States recognized one
of the party’s place of citizenship as a foreign state, a decision within
the sole discretion of the executive.133 Because the secretary of state
had not recognized Hong Kong as a state, the court decided that it
134
lacked jurisdiction.
135
The Daliberti court approved of this analysis. It noted that
congressional-executive delegations have been ruled unconstitutional
only twice in American history, “both in the same year and both
involving delegations under the same statute, the National Industrial
136
Recovery Act.” It also emphasized the determinative weight carried

125. E.g., Rein, 162 F.3d at 764.
126. Id. Though followed by all three subsequent courts, this expedient reasoning suggests
peculiar results. For example, does imputing to Congress the specific intention to target the
then-existing sponsors of terrorism mean that Libya would remain subject to suit even if the
secretary of state removed it from the list? Could Congress have intended the immunity
exception as an eternal punishment for Libya’s past sins of terrorism sponsorship?
127. 162 F.3d at 763–64.
128. 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
129. 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997).
130. 137 U.S. at 211.
131. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 1417 (2000); 137 U.S. at 209.
132. 137 U.S. at 217.
133. 118 F.3d at 83.
134. Id. at 86.
135. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50 (D.D.C. 2000).
136. Id. (quoting Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 949 F. Supp. 882, 889 (D.D.C. 1996)).
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by the secretary’s “suggestions of immunity” before the enactment of
137
the original FSIA. The court made the ingenious argument that if it
were constitutional for the secretary of state to determine federal
sovereign immunity jurisdiction before the FSIA, Congress should be
free to return that power to the secretary in individual cases.138
Although attractive, the path taken by the Rein and Daliberti
courts betrays a subtle confusion of principles. Although the
jurisdiction of the courts in Jones and Matimak did depend on a
presidential determination of a factual situation, it was a political fact
to which the secretary of state attested. In other words, the secretary
was asked to characterize diplomatic policy on the recognition of a
certain territory. Once that policy choice was made, the territory’s
legal personality and its relationship with the court were settled, and
jurisdiction either adhered or evaporated.
This mirrors the longstanding practice of denying unrecognized
states access to U.S. courts, which in turn depends on the Executive’s
recognition decision.139 The Executive has near-total discretion over
the doors to the courthouse in such cases, because it is the political
body that determines the legal personality of the petitioner’s
sovereign existence.140 As the Supreme Court wrote in Pfizer Inc. v.
India,141 “It has long been established that only governments
recognized by the United States and at peace with us are entitled to
access to our courts, and that it is within the exclusive power of the
Executive Branch to determine which nations are entitled to sue.”142
Similarly, in head-of-state immunity cases, the secretary of state still
has political discretion over whether to recognize the government
under which a defendant is claiming immunity, which in turn
determines the court’s jurisdiction.143 The court’s role is simply to take

137. Id. at 49–50.
138. Id. at 50–51.
139. See Mary Beth West & Sean D. Murphy, The Impact on U.S. Litigation of NonRecognition of Foreign Governments, 26 STAN. J. INT’L L. 435, 441 (1990) (describing
nonrecognition as a bar to access for U.S. courts).
140. Id. at 441–42.
141. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
142. Id. at 319–20.
143. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 130, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding,
upon suggestion of immunity by the Department of State, that the Haitian president was
immune from suit); Estate of Domingo v. Republic of Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (W.D.
Wash. 1988) (concluding that a former Philippine president was not immune from suit where
the Department of State had not renewed the suggestion of immunity after Ferdinand Marcos
left office).
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judicial notice of the executive-recognized political facts governing
144
the situation.
Incorporating such political facts into jurisdictional predicates is
different from delegating the power to discriminate between two
recognized governments based on policy prerogatives, however. In
Jones, Matimak, and heads-of-state immunity cases, immunity (or
jurisdiction) preexists as a legal category requiring only the filling in
of certain political facts. In other words, “‘[t]he President, by
‘recognition’ or its opposite, create[s] a general juristic field; the
courts declare[] the effect of the existence of this field on ‘standing to
145
bring suit.’” In contrast, the AEDPA’s terror-list exception to
sovereign immunity empowers the secretary of state to pick and
choose which sovereign nations will enjoy immunity whether or not
the recognized political facts governing their territory have changed.
While this discretion may be constitutional, its legitimacy cannot be
established by reference to the jurisdictional effects of presidential
determinations that simply define the legal personality of the country
before the court.
Nor does the existence of the pre-FSIA practice in which the
secretary of state filed immunity suggestions with courts dispose of
the argument. While the State Department had a say in the
application of immunity doctrines in the era before the FSIA, its
146
opinions were followed as a matter of judicial deference. No
constitutional or statutory requirement placed this power with the
executive.147 Rather, courts developed an independent common law
view of restrictive immunity while almost always accepting the
148
executive’s characterizations of its politically charged particulars.
Under the AEDPA, however, the jurisdictional effects of the State
Department’s classification of countries as terror-sponsors occur not

144. West & Murphy, supra note 139, at 468.
145. Id. at 472 (quoting Charles Black et al., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat’l
Petrochem. Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988), reprinted in
Mealey’s Litigation Rep.: Iranian Claims, Feb. 3, 1989, at 10).
146. See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 271–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (acknowledging
that courts “uniformly deferred” to Executive Branch suggestions as “conclusive,” but noting
that such determinations were not always based on consistent standards and created confusion
and inconsistent judicial results).
147. See id. at 270–71 (discussing the deference accorded to Executive Branch
determinations of immunity by courts and reviewing the development of common law doctrines
supporting such judicial deference).
148. Id.
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through a practice of judicial deference, but as a policy delegated by
149
Congress to the Executive and binding on the Judiciary. This policy,
unlike the pre-FSIA common law tradition, impinges upon the
150
“sensitive and central” issue of federal jurisdiction.
The terrorism list is a unique situation in which the Executive
can determine who may be sued in federal courts, not by the attesting
of diplomatic facts that define a country’s legally recognized status,
but by the parsing of countries for political reasons otherwise
unrelated to their standing before a court of law. Although the Rein
and Daliberti courts, and others, took care to avoid reaching the issue,
they do not chart a satisfactory path around the concerns of the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that some powers may be too sensitive
to delegate, regardless of the intelligibility of the principle that guides
their use. If anything, their arguments demonstrate the difference
between what the executive can and has always done, and the new
power the AEDPA delegates to the executive to tailor federal court
jurisdiction to its foreign policy interests.
III. MAKING THE TERRORISM LIST CONSISTENT AND EFFECTIVE
These problems highlight the perception of illegitimacy (or
worse, false legitimacy) that can be fostered by tying legal
consequences to a political list. The congressional trend is to increase
rather than decrease the list’s consequences, however.151 In light of
this trend, and to strengthen the list’s ability to meet even its political
goals, steps could be taken to at least minimize the political
calculations that skew the list’s results. While a list of such public
prominence and political significance will perhaps never be generated
with a detached and mechanized objectivity, many of the political
problems that have frozen the list for over ten years could be solved,
greatly enhancing its legitimacy as a diplomatic and legal tool. So long
as the legal and political aspects of the list are linked, their problems
must be solved together, or not at all.
The place to begin in reforming the list is the set of
recommendations put forth by the heralded National Commission on
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2000) (establishing process to designate state sponsors
of terrorism for purposes of revoking sovereign immunity under the FSIA).
150. See United States v. Mitchell, 18 F.3d 1355, 1360 n.7 (7th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing
between a permissible delegation of Congress’s commerce power and an arguably impermissible
delegation of its power over federal courts’ jurisdiction).
151. See supra Part I.
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152
Terrorism (NCT), headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. The
NCT was a ten-person, bipartisan commission created by Congress to
comprehensively review U.S. antiterrorism policy after the
153
devastating 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The
NCT report challenged Congress to redouble its efforts to fight
terrorism, but to do so with smarter and more effective tools.154
Namely, the NCT focused on the lack of dynamism and honesty in
the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the fact that competing
policy objectives had prevented its use as an effective
155
counterterrorism tool. These criticisms have even been echoed by
those responsible for administering the list.156 These problems
prompted the NCT and other observers to offer proposals for reform,
157
including creating a separate list of lesser offenders and decoupling
158
the list from automatic sanctions. Using objective fact finders to
introduce accountability into the designating process could also
promote accuracy in the list.
The aims of these proposals are largely the same: to utilize the
stigma inherent in a blacklisting process while promoting the
flexibility and honesty necessary for consistent and effective policy.
This would not solve all of the problems of extrasanction
consequences of the list, but it would make it more transparent and
accurate, and, therefore, more legitimate as a judicial tool. Moreover,
the list would likely become more useful as a counterterrorism tool.
Presidents would be freer to add and remove countries from a lean
blacklist than they would from a catch-all list laden with
diplomatically demanding and potentially embarrassing jurisdictional
159
consequences.

152. Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorism, supra note 89, at iv–v.
153. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-210.
154. Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorism, supra note 89, at 23.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report of the
National Commission on Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 106th
Cong. 27–33 (statement of Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S.
Department of State) (2000) [hereinafter Changing Threat].
157. Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorism, supra note 89, at 25.
158. See PILLAR, supra note 8, at 162–67 (discussing sanction policy in the context of state
sponsors of terrorism).
159. Id. at 170–72 (discussing the international stigma associated with being placed on the
list).
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A. Using a Two-Tiered Approach
One of the most influential recommendations of the NCT was to
seize upon an underutilized provision of the AEDPA as a means of
applying pressure to nonresponsive governments.160 The AEDPA
amends the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit the sale of defense
articles to countries “that the President determines . . . [are] not
cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.”161 These
determinations are independent of, but largely overlap with, the
terrorism list: to date, only the seven official state sponsors of
terrorism and Afghanistan under the Taliban have been designated as
“not fully cooperating.”162 This likely reveals an institutional reticence
within the State Department to attaching the stigma of the terrorist
label to friendly nations, particularly given the sanctions that come
with such a label.163 This reticence, the NCT urged, must be
164
overcome. The “Not Cooperating Fully” label, the Commission
wrote, “could be used to warn countries that may be moving toward
designation as a state sponsor.”165 Moreover, such a label “could also
be used as a ‘halfway house’ for states that have reduced support for
terrorism enough to justify removal from the state sponsors list but do
not yet deserve to be completely exonerated.”166 The NCT wasted no
time in specifying Pakistan and Greece as candidates for the
designation based on their substandard performance in
counterterrorism efforts.167
The NCT’s suggestion to use a lower-level list as a way-station
for countries on their way onto or off of the “official” list won high
praise from observers.168 Such a list would inject much needed
dynamism and honesty into the terrorism list. First, with regard to

160. Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorism, supra note 89, at 25.
161. 22 U.S.C. § 2781 (2000).
162. Gary Hufbauer, Barbara Oegg, & Jeffrey J. Schott, Using Sanctions to Fight Terrorism,
Policy Brief 01-11, INT’L. INST. ECON. (2001), at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/
pb.cfm?ResearchID=79 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
163. PILLAR, supra note 8, at 175 (“The objective is not to paint the regime as evil; that has
potential only for angering it, not for improving its behavior.”).
164. See Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorism, supra note 89, at 25 (recommending that the president
should “make more effective use of authority to designate foreign governments as ‘Not
Cooperating Fully’”).
165. Id. at 24.
166. Id. at 25.
167. Id.
168. PILLAR, supra note 8, at 173.
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allies, it would help the State Department to overcome its reticence to
call a spade a spade. The secretary of state could utilize the signal and
stigma of categorization for important allies such as Pakistan, which
169
nurtured and aided the Taliban, without triggering an automatic
wave of economic and legal sanctions that might jeopardize the
relationship. The evidence suggests that giving such a formal warning
could be effective. In December of 1992, the U.S. dropped hints that
it might add Pakistan to the list of state sponsors of terrorism based
on its support of Kashmiri guerrilla fighters.170 The response was
immediate. By January, Pakistan had ordered all Afghan Mujahedin
171
offices closed, ending a fifteen-year relationship with the fighters.
Later that year, to demonstrate its commitment to international
order, Pakistan endured significant casualties in unpopular
peacekeeping missions against fellow Muslims in Somalia.172 Pakistani
cooperation would later lead to the arrest of Ramzi Yousef, believed
to be the mastermind of the first attacks on the World Trade
Center.173
Second, using such a “halfway house” would signal to countries
on the terrorism list that such designations are not permanent. Giving
states a clear look at how they might “graduate” off the list was a
major focus of Mike Sheehan, President Clinton’s Coordinator for
174
Counterterrorism. Doing so would help the U.S. to avoid the
perception that it has a “once a terrorist state, always a terrorist state”
175
policy. This change will give countries on the list greater incentive

169. See id. at 162 (recognizing that Pakistan stays off the “official” list due to US interests
in Pakistan and South Asia, and not because it has not fostered terrorism).
170. Gerald Bourke, Washington Ready to Brand Pakistan a Terrorist State, GUARDIAN
(London), Dec. 14, 1992, at 9.
171. Kathy Evans, Pakistan Clamps Down on Afghan Mojahedin And Orders Expulsion of
Arab Jihad Supporters, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 7, 1993, at 7.
172. Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan Grieves for its Sepoys; Ahmed Rashid Explains Why
Islamabad Cannot Afford to Cut its Losses and Pull Out of Somalia, INDEPENDENT (London),
June 8, 1993, at 15.
173. Gerald Bourke, Arrest is Coup for Pakistan, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 10, 1995, at 11.
174. See Changing Threat, supra note 156, at 30 (statement of Michael A. Sheehan,
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department) (discussing the need to work with
governments for this purpose and citing efforts with Sudan and North Korea).
175. PILLAR, supra note 8, at 171. The case of Sudan illustrates the difficulty that oncestigmatized countries have in getting off the terrorism list. After years of progress, Sudan was
removed by the State Department from its list of countries “not cooperating fully” with
counterterrorism efforts. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM (2005), available at http://
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45392.htm. Yet the State Department maintains that “areas of concern
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to cooperate, since countries may stop responding to the terrorism list
if it appears that positive steps in counterterrorist policy will not be
176
rewarded.
Third, providing a clearer exit pathway off the list might also
help temper the tendency of the executive to “hijack” the terrorism
list for unrelated foreign policy goals, such as the promotion of
human rights or nuclear nonproliferation.177 In close calls, the
executive will always be tempted to use extrastatutory criteria when
178
certifying facts of any political magnitude. It justifies such decisions,
if at all, “by arguing that the substantive requirements of the
certification have been met while, at the same time, asserting that
179
other considerations weigh in favor of the certification.” The
influence of these broader policy considerations can be seen by
observing the prominence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
discussions in the annual Patterns of Global Terrorism reports put out
by the State Department.180 Most observers believe that countries like
North Korea, which the State Department acknowledges is not
181
known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987, remain on
the list primarily as bargaining chips for the end-game of nuclear
negotiations.182 Sheehan has himself expressed frustration with
interest groups in Congress that make it difficult to remove Cuba
from the list, despite its renunciation of terrorism following the
collapse of the Cold War: “I have told people on Capitol Hill, if you
have a problem with Cuba on human rights, get your own sanctions,

remain” with regard to Sudan’s terrorist activities and keeps Sudan on the list of state sponsors
of terrorism. Id. The brief treatment of Sudan in the State Department’s report does not explain
how a country can simultaneously sponsor terrorism while cooperating fully with efforts to
prevent it.
176. Id.
177. Barbara Slavin, “Terrorist State” List Should be Flexible, State Official Says Targeting
the Real “Troublemakers,” USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2000, at 14A (quoting Michael Sheehan).
178. Chinen, supra note 59, at 240–43.
179. Id. at 240.
180. See, e.g., COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM: 2001, at 66–68 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000
(emphasizing the new threat of WMDs and criticizing North Korea for its nuclear activities);
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2003, supra note 2, at 87 (2004) (further highlighting the
threat of WMD-terrorism through a special full-page section devoted to joint U.S.-European
statement on WMDs).
181. COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM: 1998, at 66–68 (1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/
1998Report/sponsor.html#nk.
182. PILLAR, supra note 8, at 162.
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183
don’t use mine.” This pressure to keep countries on the list for
extrastatutory reasons is further fueled by the all-or-nothing nature of
the terrorism list and the significant sanctions attached to it.184 Few
other provisions of U.S. law confer the kind of pariah status that
185
Diffusing this list’s
comes with being placed on the list.
consequences through use of a noncooperating list would help bring
the terrorism list back to its original statutory purposes.

B. Decoupling the List from Sanctions
Although the NCT encouraged a deeper commitment to
economic sanctions, some scholars believe that counterterrorism
efforts might be more effective if the terrorism list were decoupled
from automatic sanctions.186 This view results in part from the
decreasing willingness of the international community to engage in
multilateral sanctions, and in part from pessimism about the power of
unilateral sanctions.187 In a landmark study of threatened or imposed
sanctions, the Institute for International Economics determined that
in 34 percent of cases sanctions made “a modest contribution to the
goal sought by the [sanctioning] country and . . . the goal was in part
realized.”188 The effectiveness of these sanctions dropped off
dramatically after the 1970s, however, as the U.S.’s relative portion of
189
the global economy decreased. Only 24 percent of studied cases of
sanctions initiated between 1973 and 1990 resulted in even partial
success, despite the modest policy goals that usually motivated the
sanctions.190 When the sanctions involved “high” policy goals such as
bringing about a major change in the policies of the target country,
success was achieved in only three of thirty cases absent armed
intervention.191

183. Slavin, supra note 177.
184. PILLAR, supra note 8, at 162.
185. Id. at 170–72. Professor Pillar refers to the terrorism list as “the atomic bomb of
counterterrorist diplomacy.” Id. at 172.
186. Id. at 173.
187. See id. at 169 (recognizing “cracks” in several multilateral sanctions regimes and
difficulties with unilateral sanctions’ effectiveness).
188. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 33 (2d ed. 1990).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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Tracing a causal link between sanctions and positive behavior by
the sanctioned is difficult, particularly for countries on the terrorism
192
list. Most of these sanctions have been in place for decades, and
other events may have had a much larger effect on the behavior of
193
terror-list states than sanctions. The collapse of the Soviet Union,
for example, undoubtedly had more to do with the decline in Cuban
adventurism than did any hope of persuading the U.S. to end its
sanctions.194 Sanctions have not led to a decreased reliance on
terrorism by Iran and had little effect on the intentions of the Iraqi
195
regime prior to its removal.
Libya may be the best example of a concrete payoff from the
196
terror-list sanctions. For most of the 1990s, Libya faced a tightening
noose of U.N.- and U.S.-sponsored sanctions imposed after its
involvement in the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103, with little
apparent effect.197 Then, in 1999, Libya began to show a desire to end
its international isolation.198 First, after years of stonewalling, Libya
agreed to extradite the Pan Am bombing suspects.199 Then, following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Libya pledged its support for the war on
200
terror and declared al-Qaeda its enemy. It later agreed to settle
compensation claims with the families of the victims of Pan Am 103,
201
opening the way for the lifting of U.N. sanctions. Finally, it
announced in dramatic fashion that it was ending its WMD program
and that it would allow British and American arms inspectors to enter

192. See PILLAR, supra note 8, at 165 (noting that “it is impossible to measure accurately the
effectiveness of sanctions that have been imposed to curb sponsorship of terrorism”).
193. Id.
194. See id. at 166 (noting Cuba’s penury caused by withdrawal of Soviet aid and the
subsequent decline in its support for terrorism).
195. Id.
196. See Mark Matthews & David L. Greene, Libya Agrees to Dismantle its Weapons
Programs; Gadhafi’s Surprise Move a Bid to Shed Sanctions, Terror Label, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2003, at A1 (chronicling Libya’s acknowledgement that it had pursued weapons of mass
destruction and noting its decision to dismantle these programs).
197. See KENNETH KATZMAN, TERRORISM: NEAR-EASTERN GROUPS AND STATE
SPONSORS 32–33 (Cong. Research Serv., RL 31119, 2002) (detailing sanctions).
198. Scott Peterson, Trying to Shed Pariah Status, Libya Warms to West, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 13, 1999, at 7.
199. See KATZMAN, supra note 197, at 32 (reporting that Libya turned over two suspects in
1999 after several Security Council Resolutions).
200. See id. at 33 (indicating that Libya views al-Qaeda as a threat and that it has indicted
Osama bin Laden).
201. Id.
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202
the country to verify its commitments. Still, as one scholar has
noted, one must “distinguish[] between sanctions themselves and the
more general opprobrium with which they are associated.”203 The
latter may have as much to do with improved behavior as the former
204
in the case of attention-hungry leaders such as Qaddafi.
Even supposing that the terror-list sanctions have led to
successes such as Libya, they exact a costly diplomatic toll that
discourages the president from categorizing countries in a way that
205
would trigger their application. This toll includes greater friction
with allies that might oppose sanctions, increased suffering by the
nationals of terror-list countries, who may have no ability to change
the regimes’ policies, and a loss of business opportunities for one’s
own citizens.206 Moreover, their high cost for the sanctioned country
make them inappropriate for regimes that may be willing to
cooperate in counterterrorism efforts yet still need to be called to
account.207
A more nuanced approach to sanctions, such as one patterned on
the NCT’s textured strategy, might be preferable. The president
might, for example, choose from a “menu of sanctions, such as denial
of Export-Import bank assistance or U.S. Government procurement
208
opportunities,” rather than imposing them all at once. Since
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism itself acts as a lightning rod
209
for world attention, discouraging foreign investment and assistance,
additional official sanctions could be used more judiciously. A menu
of possible sanctions would give the president the ability to influence
state sponsors of terrorism with carrots and sticks, rather than to
impose an all-or-nothing label they are unlikely ever to shed.210 Given

202. Matthews & Greene, supra note 196.
203. PILLAR, supra note 8, at 167.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 165.
207. See id. (suggesting an individually tailored approach to sanctions).
208. See Changing Threat, supra note 156, at 32 (statement of Michael Sheehan) (discussing
the need to work with governments for this purpose and citing efforts with Sudan and North
Korea).
209. See Bob Hepburn, Regaining the Golan is Syria’s Top Priority, TORONTO STAR, May 9,
1993, at F2 (“Assad is desperate for the U.S. state department to remove Syria from its list of
states that allegedly sponsor terrorist organizations. He feels that will give the green light to
foreigners to invest in Syria.”).
210. The all-or-nothing aspect of the terrorist label itself makes removal of countries
difficult. As Professor Pillar notes, “It is politically hard to make any favorable gesture to any
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the post-9/11 threat from non-state actors, enlisting the support of the
terrorism-list countries through this menu approach is probably in the
211
U.S.’s strategic interests.
C. Using Independent Fact Finders
Many of the NCT’s recommendations, especially those related to
civil liberties and the role of the military in counterterrorism, were
controversial when delivered.212 After 9/11, however, they sound
213
frighteningly prescient. This illustrates the power of independent
commissions to chart a path through the political haze that often
clouds important decisions. One way for Congress to prevent the
institutional erosion of the terrorism list and ensure that the
designations remain accurate and effective might be to enlist
independent fact finders in the process of creating the list. Such fact
finders need not ride roughshod over political considerations, and
indeed, ultimate decisionmaking authority would likely have to rest
with the secretary of state. Establishing even a minor role for an
independent voice in the designation process, however, would expose
the political and legal compromises that inhere in the terrorism list.
Should differences in opinion between the fact finders and the
secretary emerge, pressure would build among Congress and the
public for an explanation. A measure of accountability and
transparency would thus be introduced into the process of designating
states as sponsors of terrorism. Such accountability would convey the
minimum level of legitimacy that should be expected to carry judicial
consequences.
Just such a commission was established in a different context
under the International Religious Freedom Act.214 The act created a
regime that roughly mirrors the terrorism list, authorizing the
regime that has long been labeled as embracing the evil of terrorism and about which
considerable rhetoric and resources have been expended in countering the evil behavior.”
PILLAR, supra note 8, at 171.
211. See KATZMAN, supra note 197, at 41–42 (discussing selective engagement of terror-list
countries).
212. See Franklin Foer, Sin of Commission: How an Anti-Terrorism Report Got Ignored,
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 8, 2001, at 14 (describing hostile receptions to the Commission’s report by
both public interest groups and institutional security officers).
213. See Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorism, supra note 89, at iv–v (warning of a major terrorist
atrocity on domestic soil and recommending increased military and law enforcement
cooperation). Even the cover of the report, depicting the twin towers of the World Trade
Center, proved to be “prescient.” Foer, supra note 212, at 14.
214. Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998).
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secretary of state to designate countries that trample religious
freedoms as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) and attaching
215
certain economic sanctions when such designations are made.
Unlike the provisions creating the terrorism list, however, the act also
established the Commission on International Religious Freedom
(CIRF), which must produce an annual survey of religious freedom
around the world and issue recommendations to the secretary for the
designation of CPCs.216
Comparing
CIRF
recommendations
with
the
final
determinations of the secretary of state reveals just how political the
secretary’s judgments can be, even for such an unknown and technical
217
designation as “CPC.” Each year it has existed, CIRF has urged the
secretary to designate Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and a
dozen other U.S. allies as “countries of particular concern.”218 The
CIRF commission was most vocal about Saudi Arabia, protesting the
brutalities of the Saudi religious police and noting that the State
Department’s own reports indicate that in Saudi Arabia “[f]reedom
219
of religion does not exist.” Indeed, the CIRF commission went so
far as to hold hearings on whether religious intolerance in Saudi
Arabia made the U.S. ally a “strategic threat.”220 Despite the CIRF’s
recommendations, however, the only countries designated by the
secretary of state have hewed a safe and well-trod line: Burma, China,
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan.221 It is hard to imagine such a
discrepancy between recommendations and designations passing
without scrutiny in a more contentious area such as national security
and terrorism policy.
215. Id.
216. Id. § 202, 112 Stat. 2798 (1998).
217. See id. § 402(b), 112 Stat. 2802.
218. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 7 (2003), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/
reports/02May03/finalReport.050203.pdf; see also Saudis Stay Off U.S. List of Nations Violating
Religious Freedom: List Includes China, Iran, Iraq, N. Korea, WORLDTRIBUNE.COM, March 7,
2003, at http://216.26.163.62/2003/ss_saudis_03_07.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
219. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/irf/2003/27185.htm.
220. See Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic Threat: The Global Propagation of Intolerance, Hearing
of Commission on International Religious Freedom (Nov. 18, 2003) available at http://
www.uscirf.gov/hearings/18Nov03/saudi.php3.
221. See Press Statement, U.S. Dept. of State, Designation of “Countries of Particular
Concern” Under the International Religious Freedom Act (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/18302.htm (announcing the designation).
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Had independent fact finders been present at the beginning of
the life of the terrorism list, the most embarrassing, and ultimately,
costly mistake of its tenure might have been avoided. Of the countries
placed on the list, Iraq is the only country that has been removed
based on the secretary of state’s determination that it no longer
sponsors terrorism.222 Iraq has actually been removed twice from the
list. The first time occurred in 1982 during a strategic tilt by the U.S.
223
toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. By taking Iraq off the list, the
Reagan administration freed it to receive billions of dollars in
agricultural credits and sensitive military technology, developments
that are credited with assisting its development of chemical
weapons.224 Documents emerged years later showing that the
secretaries of state under both the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush
administrations had knowledge of Iraq’s continued support for and
harboring of terrorists, including one of the most infamous terrorists,
Abu Nidal.225 Noel C. Koch, the Defense Department’s director for
counterterrorism programs at the time of Iraq’s 1982 removal, stated
in the Washington Post that “no one had any doubts about [Iraqi
president Saddam Hussein’s] continued involvement with
terrorism.”226 “The real reason,” for the removal, according to Koch,
“was to help [Iraq] succeed in the war against Iran.”227 Indeed, just
months after Iraq was removed from the terrorist list, Iraqi
intelligence agents were implicated with Abu Nidal in the 1982
assassination attempt against Shlomo Argov, Israel’s ambassador to
228
the United Kindgom. Nevertheless, the State Department persisted

222. PILLAR, supra note 8, at 169–70. The only other instance in which a country was taken
from the list occurred when South Yemen merged into the more moderate Yemen. Id.
223. Michael Gaugh, GATT Article XXI and U.S. Export Controls: The Invalidity of
Nonessential Non-Proliferation Controls, 8 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 51, 84 (1995).
224. Id.
225. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Documents Raise Questions Over Iraq Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1992, at A1.
226. At War, Iraq Courted U.S. Into Economic Embrace, WASH. POST, September 16, 1990,
at A1.
227. Id.
228. Lawrence Joffe, Obituary: Shlomo Argov, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, February 25, 2003,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,902422,00.html; David Schenker,
Removing Syria from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism: Between Peace And
Counterterrorism, WASH. INST. NEAR EAST POL. PEACE WATCH, #239, January 5, 2000, at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1930 (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
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in a campaign to transfer high-technology goods to Iraq over
229
resistance by the Pentagon and the Commerce Department.
The blowback from this manipulation of the terrorism list came
later, as the U.S. would engage in two wars against the Iraqi regime.
The rationale of the latest war against Iraq demonstrates the ultimate
political failure of the terrorism list. War was necessary, the
administration urged, because of the attempts of the Iraqi regime to
maintain and further develop weapons of mass destruction, combined
230
with the threat that these weapons would be delivered to terrorists.
But it was the politicized decision to remove Iraq from the terrorism
list that enabled it to receive military assistance that would lead to
such weapons, while, at the same time, indicating that the U.S. would
overlook its associations with terrorists. This is precisely the sort of
executive overreach that certification requirements like the terrorism
list were created to reign in.231 Had there been an independent factfinding voice, even a powerless commission, which could have called
the State Department to account over its delisting of Iraq, some of
this painful history might have been avoided. At the very least, the
U.S. would have maintained pressure on Iraq over its terrorist ties
and likely frustrated Iraqi attempts to develop weapons of mass
destruction, while avoiding the hypocritical message sent to other
countries, such as Iran, that strategic interests mattered more than
terrorism.
CONCLUSION
The list of state sponsors of terrorism, like all tools of policy,
suffers from the inconsistencies and minor hypocrisies sometimes
necessary in the real world. Unless these hypocrisies are minimized
and shielded from the domain of law, however, there is a real risk will
that the aura and stature of the terrorism list will deteriorate,
frustrating its objectives and undermining world support for
accountability, transparency, and the rule of law. Although this Note
has highlighted some of the legal challenges to Congress’s use of the
list to guide executive policymaking and deter state sponsorship of

229. Sciolino, supra note 225.
230. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Says Saddam
Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours: Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation
(March 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303177.html.
231. Chinen, supra note 59, at 233.
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terrorism, the list remains an essential component of the American
counterterrorism arsenal. As that arsenal confronts the enormous
challenges of the post-9/11 world, policymakers should reformulate
the list as a more precise instrument for imposing sanctions and
stigma, thereby avoiding the one-size-fits-all penalties that make it
politically impossible to use the list against any but the most
232
distasteful of pariah states. If this can be accomplished, the list will
move toward becoming a more objective picture of state sponsorship
of terrorism, mitigating the legal inconsistencies it generates. It would
also allow Congress to progress towards its goal of holding
recalcitrant regimes, and the State Department, accountable.

232. See PILLAR, supra note 8, at 173 (detailing the benefits of both decoupling the terrorlist and having a more individualized approach to sanctions).

